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PROCESS AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
S. Gless 
1. The European Evidence Warrant, Free Movement of Evidence, and Due 
Process 
The title of my article tends to appear and read like a triangle: 
1. The 'European Evidence Warrant,' proposed by the European Commission 
just over a year ago1 
2. 'Free movement of evidence,' expounded at the Tampere Council in 1999 
and affirmed as an important goal in the Hague Programme of 5th Novem-
ber 20042 ( often referred to as 'Tampere II')3 
3. 'Due process,'4 which is not defined as such by any EU document, but has 
its substance in the case law of the ECHR. In the EU framework, the princi-
ples of' due process' were first outlined in a Green Paper, which forms the 
basis for a recently sketched minimum standard laid down in a new EU 
proposal for a framework decision on certain procedural rights in criminal 
proceedings throughout the EU.5 Also important in this respect are the basic 
'Justice rights' laid down in Arts. 47 ff. of the Treaty for a European Consti-
tution.6 
This triangle may appear to many people to be very similar to the famous Ber-
muda one, and thus they fear that everything might become lost. But my goal 
is rather to map the triangle as an area of an European judicial landscape. In 
doing so, my article will hopefully serve as one starting point for further discus-
1 COM(2003) 688 final, Brussels, 14.11.2003 and Mr. Williams' contribution (p. 69) .. 
2 Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 5.11.2004 (14292/04), no. 3.3.1. 
3 See Mr. A IJzerman' s contribution (p. 5) .. 
4 See for detailed information the contribution of Ch. Brants (p. 103). 
5 COM(2004) 328 final, Brussels, 28.4.2004. 
6 For further information see: Dutheil de la Rochere, 'The EU and the Individual: Fundamental Rights 
in the Draft Constitutional Treaty', Common Market Law Review 2004. 345££. 
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sion on the detailed shaping of an area of freedom, security, and justice with the 
objective of balancing interests which are not always compatible. 
In spite of all the new promising proposals, my position in this session on 
'Mutual recognition, judicial inquiries, due process and fundamental rights' will 
be very critical, and in some respects I will even act as a sort of 'devil's advo-
cate.' 
In my presentation I want to follow a three-step approach: (1) Mark each corner 
point of the triangle with a statement; (2) argue the case very briefly, and (3) try 
to connect these points and fill in the blanks. 
In doing so, I will rearrange the points: I will start out with the idea of the 
'free movement of evidence' or, rather, the 'mutual recognition of evidence' - the 
two terms describe the same basic principle. Subsequently, I will briefly explain 
the idea of' due process' ( or 'fair trial') in national criminal trials. In a final step, 
I will explain the relevant features of the proposal for a European Evidence 
Warrant, namely the expected impact on the evolution of a 'free movement of 
evidence' and will sketch the consequences of the European Evidence Warrant 
for' due process.' 
2. Free movement of evidence 
Talking about the concept of free movement of evidence is something of a pro-
vocation in itself. As far as I am aware, the expression is not used in any official 
EU document. 
The official language refers to the 'principle of mutual recognition' of evi-
dence, while the term describes the same ambition from a different angle. The 
'free movement' terminology, however, effectively reveals the origins of the idea 
as set out in the Tampere conclusions in 1999. 
Earlier, during the Council of Cardiff, British officials had proposed this 
scheme as a concept for the emerging framework of Justice and Home Affairs 
- as an alternative model to the idea of harmonisation.7 This extension of a 
principle which was well established in the internal market of the Community 
and which was practised with regard to civil and commercial judgements was 
well received. The Council - and other European institutions - later translated 
this idea of 'mutual recognition' into a programme of various measures handed 
out in 2001.8 Since then, the principle of mutual recognition has been a corner-
stone in the area of freedom, justice, and security, and we will have to live with 
the consequences. But what are the consequences? 
Free movement worked very well in the EC framework of a Common Market, 
transporting goods, persons, services, and capital across borders. The reasoning 
7 See: Peers, 'Mutual Recognition and Criminal Law', in: Common Market Law Review 2004, 5 and 9. 
8 Programme of measures to implement the principle of mutu"!- recognition of decisions in criminal 
matters, OJ C 12 of 15.1.2001, 10. 
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must therefore have been that it could solve the problems of criminal law en-
forcement across borders in an area of security, freedom, and justice, as well. 
My first thesis however is: 
The free movement approach sketched in the conclusions of the Tampere 
Council as a 'mutual admissibility concept'9 will not work as well with 
regard to the 'transfer of evidence.' 
The main source for my doubts10 is the fact that the object of intended transfer 
is not a real thing, but a legal construct, which serves certain legal, i.e. abstract 
needs, and not basic needs like those of consumers. As we all know, the pre-
requisites for admissible evidence and the conditions for its gathering are a 
specific consequence of the characteristics of a certain legal system and are thus 
quite different across Europe.11 That is one of the reasons why, within the 
framework of mutual assistance, only the trial court decides on the admission 
and value of certain evidence. 
This is not only true within the framework of mutual assistance between the 
Member Statesi it is also a fact with regard to OLAF investigations, as Mr. 
Perduca's article shows:12 The value of final reports drafted by OLAF in the fact-
finding process of a criminal trial depends on national law.13 They may also be 
'information only.' 
Unlike consumer needs, which are the ultimate force behind the common 
market and its concept of free movement of goods, services, persons and capital, 
evidence must also serve a legal purpose within the framework of a national 
legal system mainly shaped by a certain tradition, which provides - among 
other things - for trust in a certain fact-finding procedure. 
There is thus a danger that the free movement of evidence approach could 
lead to the admission of evidence in criminal trials which is of inherently poor 
quality, because it cannot serve a court in a certain system. 
9 See the Conclusions of the Tampere Council, No. 36. 
10 Many people share these doubts, see e.g.: Peers, 'Mutual Recognition and Criminal Law', in: Common 
Market Law Review 2004, 5££. 
11 For detailed information see: Spencer, 'Evidence' in: Delmas-Marty /Spencer ( eds.) European Criminal 
Procedures (Cambridge 2002), pp. 594 ff. 
12 See the contribution of S. de Moor (p. 47). 
13 Art. 8 (3) of Regulation No. 2185/96 of 11 November 1996 concerning on the spot checks and inspec-
tions: ' ... The reports thus prepared shall constitute admissible evidence in administrative or judicial 
proceedings of the Member State in which their use proves necessary, in the same way and under the 
same conditions as administrative reports drawn up bi; national administrative inspectors ... ' 
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3. Due process 
'Due process' is a legal construct, too. Each Member State has formed its own 
idea of' due process' by striking a careful balance between civil liberties (such 
as the privacy of the individual) and the privileges of the accused (such as the 
right to silence) on the one hand, and the need to ensure effective prosecutions 
and investigations on the other.14 
Today, however, there is a European framework for 'procedural safeguards.' 
The rights of defendants in criminal trials are not only mentioned in various EU 
documents and are drafted in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, but will 
be integrated in the Constitutional Treaty.15 
A long time ago and, for the substance of due process, much more impor-
tantly, the European Court of Human Rights set up a common and binding stan-
dard for 'due process' on the basis of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. 
The Court's case law, however, can only serve as a European 'reference 
system' if and insofar as the European Convention on Human Rights lays down 
a minimum standard. It does not do so at the core of evidence law. 
My second thesis is thus: 
'Due process' with regard to the rules of evidence describes a specific balance 
in national legal systems. The ECHR does not provide a minimum standard 
in this area. 
The common presumption in the discussion on' due process' and the 'principle 
of mutual recognition,' however, is that there will be no serious conflict, because 
all Member States are bound by the ECHR and thus are supposed to provide 
comparable protection of individual rights. While the premise is correct - all EU 
Member States are bound by the ECHR - the conclusion is not, I fear. This 
becomes clear especially in the area of the transfer of evidence: 
All EU Member States have their own rules of evidence, governing fact-finding 
in criminal trials. The ECHR does not contain any explicit imperative on the 'rules 
of evidence.' 
In accordance with its status as a subsidiary relief institution, the European 
Court of Human Rights thus takes the position that the admissibility of evidence 
is primarily governed by the rules of domestic law - provided that they respect 
the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention. 
14 See McBride, 22 European Law Review (1997), pp. 1 ff.; Ormerod/Roberts, The International Journal of 
Evidence & Proof, pp. 38££.; Sanders, in: Eser/Rabenstein (Hrsg.), Strajjustiz im Spannungsfeld (Freiburg 
2004); Sharpe, Criminal Law Review (1997], pp. 848££.; de Smet, RIDP 1999, pp. 761££. 
15 See Arts. 47 ff. of the Treaty for a European Constitution. 
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As a general rule, only the procedure of collecting evidence is of relevance to the 
Convention's guarantees, for example, whether or not the rights of the accused 
to a fair trial ( overall) have been respected. In this area, the ECHR has had an 
immense effect on criminal procedure in European countries.16 
Even with regard to these relevant guarantees contained in the ECHR, 
however, important variations in the implementation of these articles still exist 
between Member States. This is primarily a consequence of the different legal 
traditions and is possible because of the 'margin of appreciation doctrine' ap-
plied by the ECHR to accommodate the national differences. 
Although there is a great deal of case law, it often remains difficult to con-
clude from the ECHR' s decisions whether - or rather - to what extent the use 
of illegally or unfairly obtained evidence constitutes such a violation. 
Hence, the ECHR very often lacks an answer as to whether a certain piece 
of evidence - collected legally or illegally in one country - may be admitted in 
a court in another country. 
One blind spot, for example, is the ambit of the right to refrain from giving 
evidence ('Zeugnisverweigerungsrechte'): Can all the members of the defen-
dant's family claim this privilege, as well as his priest and the local newspaper 
journalist? This is the case according to German law.17 It is not the case in the 
United Kingdom.18 
Looking only at this example, there appears to be no ground for the presump-
tion of comparable standards in the area of the rules of evidence. 
European institutions, however, have realized the non-existence inside the 
triangle of 'safeguards for civil liberties and defendants' rights' and have started 
to devote attention to this subject.19 The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
which will be part of the Constitutional Treaty, is the most prominent example. 
With regard to the question of equivalent standards for procedural rights in 
criminal proceedings, the proposal for a Council Framework Decision on certain 
procedural rights in criminal proceedings was presented in April 2004. 
These acts, however, are not yet legally binding. Many of the NGOs there-
fore claim that cross-border evidence gathering within the EU framework entails 
a risk for the rights of defendants.20 
16 Jung, Goltdammer' sArchiv 2003, p. 198; Persaud, in: Gearty ( ed.) European Civil Liberties and the European 
Conventian on Human Rights (1997), pp. 356££.; Sieber, Juristenzeitung 1997, p. 375. 
17 See §§ 52, 53 of the German Criminal Procedure Code ('Strafprozessordnung'). 
18 See Honeyghon and Sayles [1999] CrimLR 221; Thompson (1976) 64 CrAppR 96; Attorney General v. 
Clough [1963] 1 QB 773. 
19 Persaud, in: Gearty (ed.) European Civil Liberties and the European Convention on Human Rights (1997), 
pp. 347££.; Whelan, in: Barrett (ed.), Justice Cooperation in the European Unian (1997), pp. 212££. 
20 See e.g. http:/ /www.statewatch.org/ news/2004/ mar /22eu-evid-warrant.htm; Justice response to the 
European Commission Consultation Paper on Procedural Safeguards for Suspects and Defendants in 
Criminal Proceedings (April 2002). 
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4. The Impact of the Proposed European Evidence Warrant on 'Due Process' 
The proposal for a European Evidence Warrant21 implements the 'principle of 
mutual recognition.' It has the aim of simplifying and accelerating the gathering 
and transfer of evidence in criminal proceedings with a cross-border element.22 
It is mainly intended to replace the 19th century mutual assistance approach 
with a modem procedure,23 which is a worthy notion: 
A simple form would be sent between Member States' authorities, including 
an order from the 'Issuing State' for the 'Executing State' to carry out certain 
activities. The 'Executing State' would have to comply with the order of the 
'Issuing State,' unless limited grounds for refusing to comply with the order 
could be invoked. The proposal wishes to abolish - among other things - the 
possibility of refusing to comply because of differences in the law or practice of 
the two States. 
The proposal, however, is silent with regard to the question of the admissibility 
of evidence, which means: It does not address the subject directly - but even if 
the issue is not dealt with directly the proposal still does intend to facilitate the 
admissibility of evidence obtained from the territory of another Member State24 
using several tools. I will point out three, which touch upon the topic of' due 
process'. 
First, the proposal hopes to facilitate admissibility by including the safeguards 
in the EEW procedure, using four different instruments: .(1) Only judicial 
authorities may issue such a warrant.25 (2) Several conditions must be met before 
a warrant is issued.26 (3) The executing state has procedural safeguards in 
place.27 (4) Certain grounds of refusal may be claimed by-the executing state.28 
Apart from this instruments the proposal secondly wants to facilitate the 
admissibility of evidence through the enforcement of the 'forum regit actum 
principle': that is, according to the general principle29 laid down in the proposal, 
the executing state cannot refuse to comply with the requirements requested by 
the issuing state when carrying out a warrant, except if the formalities and 
21 COM(2003) 688 final, Brussels, 14.11.2003. 
22 Explanatory Memorandum Nos. 28 ff., Proposal for a European Evidence Warrant. 
23 Explanatory MemorandumNnos. 38 f., Proposal for a European Evidence Warrant. 
24 See also: Explanatory Memorandum Nos. 56 ff., Proposal for a European Evidence Warrant. 
25 See Art. 1 (1) of the Proposal for a European Evidence Warrant. 
26 See Art. 6 of the Proposal for a European Evidence Warrant. 
27 See Art. 12 and Art. 13 of the Proposal for a European Evidence Warrant. 
28 See Art. 15 of the Proposal for a European Evidence Warrant. 
29 See Art. 15 of the Proposal for a European Evidence Warrant. 
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procedures indicated by the requesting state would be contrary to its fundamen-
tal principles.30 
Thirdly, it has been proposed that the EEW should be issued only when the 
issuing authority is satisfied that its own law would also allow the evidence to 
be obtained if it were on its own territory. Thus, the national authorities cannot 
shortcut legal privileges31 and - as a general rule - the evidence gathered abroad 
can be used in the trial. 
Weighing these safeguards my third thesis is the following: 
The current proposal for a European Evidence Warrant may still endanger 
'due process' on the national level in some respects because the safeguards 
provided are not sufficient. 
I cannot discuss this thoroughly now. I only want to draw attention to three 
issues: 
1. The EEW lacks the provision laid down in Art. 1 (3) ~f the European Arrest 
Warrant, namely that the Member States must respect fundamental rights 
and basic principles laid down in Art. 6 TEU. 
2. The EEW would, as a general rule, eliminate the 'dual criminality' restriction 
of traditional mutual assistance.32 Thus, an order would have to be executed 
for searching of evidence to prove an alleged crime, which is not a crime in 
the country of execution. 
In other words: An Irish authority could issue a European Evidence order to 
obtain documents held in a clinic which carried out abortions in Amsterdam. 
We are familiar with the arguments made concerning sovereignty from the 
discussion about the European Arrest Warrant. 
3. Furthermore, the current proposal for the EEW does not fully ensure the 
rights of individuals (third persons, criminal suspects, and defendants alike) 
when such proceedings are underway.33 
For example: 
The substantive reasons for issuing an EEW can only be challenged in the 
issuing statei not in the executing state.34 This provision does not take adequate 
30 See Art. 13 (e) of the Proposal for a European Evidence Warrant. 
31 For further information on the problem of 'forum shopping' by law enforcement agencies, see: Nelles, 
'Europaisierung des Strafverfahrens', 109 (1997) Zeitschrift fiir die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft, 738. 
32 See Art. 16 (e) of the Proposal for a European Evidence Warrant, which eliminates the requirement (a) 
in cases in which 'it is not necessary to carry out a search of private premises for the execution of the 
warrant as well as (b) for 39 areas of criminality. 
33 There are, however, always two sides: The proposed framework decision could be used to gather and 
transmit evidence of potential use not only to the prosecution, but also to the defence. Tiris is true 
especially in civil law jurisdictions ('Instruktionsprinzip'). 
34 See Art. 19 of the Proposal for a European Evidence Warrant. 
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account of the linguistic, financial, and technical barriers faced by individuals 
when bringing legal challenges abroad. 
Concluding this part of the analysis, one has to state that even if the EEW 
would solve the problems of a lengthy mutual assistance procedure, the pro-
posal definitely raises new problems of' due process' on the national level. 
5. Conclusion 
Mutual recognition of judicial decisions is a good concept with regard to final 
decisions,35 such as judgements (acquittals and convictions alike), which may 
trigger the 'ne bis in idem' effect. 
Decisions concerning evidence, however, are only part of a criminal trial, 
part of an ongoing proceeding regulated by a complex and delicate system of 
procedural 'checks and balances.' The validity of a criminal trial can only be 
judged when taking the whole process into account. One cannot look at bits and 
pieces. As long as the respective procedures vary from state to state, the auto-
matic mutual recognition of 'evidence' would disturb all kinds of delicate 
balances in this system, for example the prerequisites of the free assessment of 
evidence or the balance between civil liberties and the privileges of the accused. 
Such a disturbance would not add any value to the existing criminal justice 
systems, but would rather endanger them. 
This would be different if criminal procedure were harmonized across 
Europe. Thus, the approach of 'mutual recognition' resurrects the harmonisation 
issue, which it was supposed to keep out to begin with. One example for this 
connection is the relevant provision in the Constitution: 'The Union shall 
endeavour to ensure a high level of security through measures to prevent and 
combat crime ... through measures for coordination and cooperation between 
police and judicial authorities and other competent authorities, as well as 
through the mutual recognition of judgements in criminal matters and, if 
necessary, through the approximation of criminal laws.'36 In other words: The 
draft EU Constitution does make the concept of mutual recognition formally the 
core of criminal law cooperation in the EU, accompanying it with EU powers to 
harmonize substantive criminal law and domestic criminal procedure in certain 
areas.37 
35 See: Gless, 'Zuro Prinzip der gegenseitigen Anerkennung', 116 (2004) Zeitschrift fiir die gesamte 
Strafrechtswissenschaft, 353; for a detailed analysis see: Weyembergh/Gilles de Kerchove (eds.) La 
reconnaissance mutuelle des didsions judidaires en matii!re penale dans I' Union europeenne (2001). 
36 Art. ID-257 (3) of the Treaty for a European Constitution. 
37 See Arts. ID-166 and 167 of the Treaty for a European Constitution. 
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Thus the question again arises: Will it be possible to construct a European 
law of evidence? Or are the various rules of procedure too diverse?38 This 
question has yet not been answered in a satisfactory way, even though valid 
models for rules of a common European evidence procedure have been pre-
sented.39 
The triangle demarcating the area of the transfer of evidence between (a) the 
principle of mutual recognition or, in our case, the 'free movement of evidence', 
(b) the 'European Evidence Warrant, and (c) 'due process' still remains some-
thing of a no man's land. 
If one takes a pessimistic approach, one must fear that not only the practitio-
ners having to deal with another set of rules in cross-border evidence gathering, 
but also the citizens, might become lost. 
If one takes an optimistic stand, then completely new possibilities open up.40 
38 See e.g. Den Boer, 'Crime and the Constitution', MJ 2004, 145; Hetzer, 'National Criminal Prosecution 
and European Tendering of Evidence', in: 12Eurapean Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 
(2004), p. 166 ff. 
39 One approach was taken by the Corpus Juris team in Arts. 31 ff. (published by Economica Paris 1997). 
For further information see: Delmas-Marty /Vervaele ( eds.), Theimplementation of the Corpus Juris in the 
Member States, Vol. IV (2001), pp. 233ff. and 271ff. 
40 For further information on mutual recognition as a principal basis for judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters: Den Boer, 'Crime and the Constitution', MJ2004, 145£. 
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